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Abstract (149 words) 26 
The use of interval forecasts allows climate scientists to issue predictions with high levels of 27 
certainty even for areas fraught with uncertainty, since wide intervals are objectively more 28 
likely to capture the truth than narrow intervals. However, wide intervals are also less 29 
informative about what the outcome will be than narrow intervals, implying a lack of 30 
knowledge or subjective uncertainty in the forecaster. In six experiments, we investigate how 31 
lay people perceive the (un)certainty associated with wide and narrow interval forecasts, and 32 
find that the preference for accuracy (seeing wide intervals as “objectively” certain) vs. 33 
informativeness (seeing wide intervals as indicating “subjective” uncertainty) is influenced by 34 
contextual cues (e.g., question formulation). Most importantly, we find that people more 35 
commonly and intuitively associate wide intervals with uncertainty than with certainty. Our 36 
research thus challenges the wisdom of using wide intervals to construct statements of high 37 
certainty in climate change reports. 38 
 39 
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1. Introduction 42 
 43 
The knowledge of general principles governing the climate system is sufficient to 44 
make strong qualitative predictions about climate change. For instance, the Intergovernmental 45 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) leaves little room for doubt when concluding that 46 
“continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all 47 
components of the climate system” (IPCC 2013). In contrast, it is not possible to make precise 48 
quantitative predictions of exactly how the climate will change, even under a given forcing 49 
scenario (such conditional predictions are typically called projections). Thus, climate 50 
scientists generally issue predictions in the form of interval (range) forecasts (e.g., 0.3 to 51 
1.7°C temperature rise1, 0.26 to 0.55 m sea level rise) rather than point forecasts (e.g., 1.0°C 52 
temperature rise). Interval estimates allow a tradeoff between forecast precision and forecast 53 
certainty, or what Yaniv and Foster (1995) has described as a tradeoff between 54 
informativeness and accuracy. If a high degree of certainty (accuracy) is desired, one can 55 
forecast a wide interval (the rate of sea level rise [during the 21st century] will very likely 56 
exceed that observed during 1971 to 2010 [meaning more than a 20 cm rise]). This is 57 
commonly done in the IPCC reports when summary statements of high certainty are sought. 58 
Alternatively, if a high level of precision (informativeness) is desired, one can forecast a 59 
narrower interval with a lower degree of certainty (it is likely the sea level will rise between 60 
26 and 55 cm). 61 
While a large body of research shows that people often misunderstand the verbal 62 
probability expressions (e.g., “very likely”, “unlikely”) used by the IPCC (Budescu et al. 63 
2009; Budescu et al. 2012; Budescu et al. 2014; Harris and Corner 2011; Harris et al. 2017; 64 
Harris et al. 2013; Ho et al. 2015; Juanchich and Sirota 2017), few studies have examined 65 
                                                
1 All examples are taken from IPCC, 2013: Summary for policymakers. Climate change 2013: The physical 
science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, T. F. Stocker, and Coauthors, Eds., Cambridge University Press. 
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how lay people respond to the use of intervals to communicate degrees of (un)certainty in the 66 
climate change domain (Dieckmann et al. 2015; Dieckmann et al. 2017; Joslyn and LeClerc 67 
2016; Løhre and Teigen 2017). We argue and demonstrate in this paper that the relationship 68 
between interval width (i.e., forecast precision) and certainty is ambiguous: a wide interval 69 
(an imprecise forecast) is “accurate” in the sense that it has a high probability of capturing the 70 
actual outcome, but its width also signals greater uncertainty about what the outcome will be, 71 
in comparison to a narrow interval (a more precise and hence more informative forecast). This 72 
ambiguity makes it important for forecasters to know whether lay people see wide intervals as 73 
more (or less) certain than narrow ones, and which of these two perspectives on intervals is 74 
more frequent and more intuitively appealing. 75 
The two perspectives on the relationship between interval width and certainty may 76 
rely on two forms of certainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Hacking 1975; Kahneman and 77 
Tversky 1982). On the one hand, certainty refers to our state of knowledge or belief. Such 78 
internal or subjective certainty is often expressed by statements where the subject is a sentient 79 
being (“I am 90% certain”), and using subjective terms like being confident, or sure (Fox and 80 
Ülkümen 2017; Ülkümen et al. 2016). But certainty can also be used in an external, more 81 
objective sense, reflecting variability, predictability and randomness in the outside world. 82 
Degrees of certainty are in these contexts often embedded in statements with an impersonal 83 
subject (“it is 90% certain”), and are used synonymously with degrees of probability, 84 
likelihood, or chance (Juanchich et al. 2017; Løhre and Teigen 2016). 85 
With interval predictions, a wider interval allows for a greater degree of objective 86 
certainty (more hits and fewer misses). Even if the exact number of hits vs. misses can be 87 
assessed only retrospectively, after the outcomes are known, this general relationship can be 88 
claimed prospectively on purely logical grounds. Subjective certainty, however, might not 89 
increase with interval width. In fact, people may see wide intervals as cueing uncertainty and 90 
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lack of knowledge, for two reasons. First, more knowledge about a topic enables one to be 91 
more precise in one’s statements about it (Yaniv and Foster 1997). Second, conversational 92 
norms suggest that people seek to maximize informativeness in communication (Grice 1975). 93 
The prediction “The temperature in Oslo will be between -35 and +35°C tomorrow” is true, 94 
with close to 100% certainty, but is also far too vague to be useful for someone preparing for 95 
a visit. A forecaster with higher subjective confidence may make a more precise, informative 96 
prediction (“The temperature at noon will be between 15 and 18°C”), which can be seen as 97 
conveying more certain expectations about tomorrow’s weather. 98 
Thus, different concepts of certainty might lead to different views on the implications 99 
of wide vs. narrow interval predictions. Those who find a wide interval to be more certain, by 100 
being more likely to include the true (actual) values, will in this paper be referred to as 101 
showing a preference for accuracy. In contrast, those who consider a wide interval to be less 102 
certain, by being less informative and expressing lower confidence about expected outcomes, 103 
display a preference for informativeness. 104 
Previous research has found support for both types of preference (or “mindsets”). In 105 
line with the informativeness mindset, lay people expect experts to give narrower interval 106 
estimates than novices (McKenzie et al. 2008). Recipients of information prefer precise 107 
statements (Du et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2016), with narrow intervals occasionally preferred 108 
over wide intervals even when the wide interval includes the correct answer while the narrow 109 
interval does not (McKenzie and Amin 2002; Yaniv and Foster 1995). Teigen (1990) found 110 
that people placed more confidence in precise statements than in vague statements, but also 111 
that people chose the more precise statement when asked which statement they would be 112 
more skeptical about. Participants in a recent study received high and low probability 113 
forecasts made by climate change experts, and completed the forecasts by filling in 114 
corresponding intervals (Løhre and Teigen 2017). Some associated high probabilities with 115 
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wide intervals, but many did the opposite and assigned narrow intervals to high probabilities. 116 
Similar results were obtained when people were given wide and narrow interval forecasts, and 117 
asked to fill in missing probability values. Some participants assumed wide intervals were 118 
more probable, whereas others felt they were less probable than narrow intervals. 119 
These studies leave open several important questions that we address in the present 120 
paper. (1) Is one “mindset” more prevalent than the other? (2) Can contextual and linguistic 121 
cues, which are known to change the way people think about probabilities (Løhre and Teigen 122 
2016; Nisbett et al. 1983; Reeves and Lockhart 1993; Ülkümen et al. 2016), also influence 123 
people’s views on the relationship between interval width and certainty? These two questions 124 
were investigated in Experiments 1-5, where we manipulated the focus of a question about 125 
certainty. We predicted that a question about which of two intervals is “more certain to be 126 
correct”, would promote reflections about objective certainty, accuracy and the probability of 127 
hits and misses, and should accordingly be answered in favour of the wide interval. On the 128 
other hand, a question about which interval “conveys more certainty”, would make thoughts 129 
about informational value and subjective certainty more salient, and induce people to find 130 
wide intervals to imply less certainty than narrow ones. (3) A third issue is which mindset 131 
people find more intuitive. Experiment 6 investigated people’s lay theories about interval 132 
width and probability, and asked people to rate how intuitively appealing two statements 133 
compatible with the two mindsets were. 134 
 135 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 136 
 137 
2. Experiments 1-5: Effects of question type on the perception of wide vs. narrow 138 
intervals 139 
a. Participants 140 
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The participants in these experiments (total N = 923, see Table 1) were university 141 
students from the UK and Norway who volunteered to participate or who received course 142 
credits for participation, and Amazon MTurk workers from the US who were paid to 143 
complete the questionnaires. Both of these types of convenience samples are typical in 144 
psychology experiments, and are often reasonably similar to community samples (Goodman 145 
et al. 2013; Paolacci et al. 2010). For the purpose of the current studies, namely to investigate 146 
subjective perceptions of interval forecasts of climate change, we would expect that 147 
participants from these samples should be at least as well-equipped (if not better) to interpret 148 
the information as more representative samples. 149 
b. Materials and procedure 150 
In all experiments, the participants received interval forecasts of sea level rise and 151 
temperature rise by the end of the century from two different teams of climate scientists. One 152 
team issued a forecast with a wide interval (e.g., “The temperature will increase between 1.1° 153 
Celsius and 6.4° Celsius”), while the other team gave a forecast with a narrower interval (e.g., 154 
“The temperature will increase between 2.2° Celsius and 5.4° Celsius”). The participants were 155 
asked, in three to four different conditions in the different experiments, to choose which 156 
prediction “conveys more uncertainty [certainty]” or which prediction “is more likely [certain, 157 
uncertain] to be correct”. These questions were formulated to focus on informativeness or on 158 
accuracy, respectively. An overview of the questions used in the different experiments is 159 
provided in Table 2, and more detailed descriptions of the procedure for each experiment is 160 
provided below. The full description of the scenarios, as well as separate statistical analysis of 161 
each experiment, can be found in the Supplementary materials (in the Results section, only 162 
the overall results are described). Several of the experiments also investigated secondary 163 
hypotheses, which are briefly described below, while more detailed descriptions and analyses 164 
are provided in the Supplementary materials. 165 
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 166 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 167 
 168 
1) MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE VARIATIONS IN EXPERIMENTS 1-5 169 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated question type and reasons for variability in a 2 x 2 170 
within-subject design. Participants completed a daily survey for 14 days. On the third day, the 171 
participants received questions about which interval “is most likely to be correct” and on day 172 
6 which interval “conveys most uncertainty”. The same questions were repeated on days 9 173 
and 11, but here, participants also received an explanation for the variability in the expert 174 
forecasts. The variability was explained by referring to temperature rise “in different 175 
countries” and sea level rise “in different parts of the world”. On day 14 participants rated 176 
their belief in climate change by answering four questions taken from Heath and Gifford 177 
(2006). For each scenario (temperature and sea level rise), participants could choose one of 178 
the two predictions or rate them as equal. 179 
Participants in Experiment 2 received the same questions as in Experiment 1, but this 180 
was a 2 x 2 design with question type and reason for variability varied between subjects. 181 
Hence, participants in different groups received questions either about which interval 182 
“conveys most uncertainty” or which interval “is most likely to be correct”, and either 183 
received an explanation for the variability in estimates or did not receive such an explanation. 184 
In Experiment 3, we attempted to control for some potential confounding factors in 185 
Experiments 1 and 2. Beside their focus on informativeness or accuracy, the questions used in 186 
the first two experiments differed in several respects. First, the term “uncertainty” was used in 187 
the informativeness-focus condition and the term “likely” was used in the accuracy-focus 188 
condition. These terms were assumed to be associated with different sources of uncertainty, 189 
with “uncertainty” being an internal/epistemic term, and “likely” an external/aleatory term 190 
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(Ülkümen et al. 2016). Second, the two terms differ in their directionality (Teigen and Brun 191 
1995, 1999). While “uncertain” has a negative directionality (i.e., it points towards the 192 
possibility that an outcome might not occur), “likely” has a positive directionality (i.e., it 193 
points towards the possibility that an outcome might occur). To better control for the source 194 
of uncertainty and directionality of the verbal probabilities used in the question, we used the 195 
two terms “uncertain(ty)” and “certain(ty)”, which are usually considered as reflecting 196 
epistemic uncertainty (Fox and Ülkümen 2011; Teigen and Løhre 2017; Ülkümen et al. 197 
2016). The word stem was hence kept constant, while directionality and question type varied 198 
between-subjects, with different groups of participants receiving the question about which 199 
prediction “conveys more [un]certainty” and which prediction is “more [un]certain to be 200 
correct”. 201 
In Experiment 4, we removed the (arguably incorrect) “equal” option, so the 202 
participants chose between the wide and the narrow interval in each condition. Participants 203 
read the same temperature rise and sea level rise vignettes as in previous experiments in one 204 
of three conditions: uncertainty conveyed, certainty conveyed, and certain to be correct.  205 
In Experiment 5, we added a third prediction that featured a narrower interval to each 206 
vignette, for two reasons: first, to highlight even more strongly that the teams differ in width 207 
of prediction intervals; and second, since the intervals in previous experiments were both 208 
quite wide, to include a very narrow interval that suggests high precision, but might be “too 209 
good to be true”. Participants read the sea level and temperature rise scenarios and for each 210 
selected one of the three forecasts as the one that conveyed more certainty, conveyed more 211 
uncertainty or was more certain to be correct, in three between-subjects conditions. 212 
2) SECONDARY HYPOTHESES 213 
In addition to investigating the prevalence of the informativeness and accuracy 214 
mindsets and their associations with different kinds of questions, Experiments 1-5 also 215 
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addressed some additional hypotheses. In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether the 216 
accuracy mindset would be seen as more appropriate (i.e., wide intervals associated with 217 
certainty) in contexts where interval width could be related to variability. Predictions 218 
concerning a class of multiple outcomes might induce more distributional (“outside view”) 219 
thinking, with wide intervals reflecting external variability, in contrast to predictions of a 220 
singular outcome, where wide intervals are more easily taken to reflect the forecaster’s 221 
ignorance (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; Nisbett et al. 1983; 222 
Reeves and Lockhart 1993). Hence, participants in different conditions in Experiments 1 223 
(within-subjects) and 2 (between-subjects) were told that the intervals described temperature 224 
rise “in different countries” and sea level rise “in different parts of the world”, while no 225 
explanation for the variability in the estimate was given in the other conditions. 226 
In Experiment 3, we investigated whether perceptions of expertise could be influenced 227 
by question type, with the hypothesis that questions highlighting informativeness would lead 228 
to a stronger preference for experts giving narrow interval forecasts, as compared to questions 229 
highlighting accuracy. Therefore, after selecting the prediction that conveys more 230 
(un)certainty/is more (un)certain to be correct, participants in Experiment 3 rated which team 231 
seemed more trustworthy, seemed to have most knowledge (about temperature rise or sea 232 
level rise), seemed to have the best models (for predicting temperature rise or sea level rise), 233 
and which team seemed to be most competent. These ratings were done on scales from 1 234 
(definitely the team with the wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the narrow interval). 235 
Experiment 4 investigated factors that might explain people’s preference for narrow 236 
intervals: their fluency and the perceived expertise of the speaker. Previous research has 237 
found that statements that are more fluent (i.e., easier to process), for example due to 238 
repetition or to heightened visibility, are judged as more truthful than less fluent statements 239 
(Arkes et al. 1989; Reber and Schwarz 1999). We expected that predictions with narrower 240 
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intervals might be easier to process than predictions with wider intervals, and that this 241 
heightened fluency could be a reason why people prefer narrow intervals. Narrow intervals 242 
might also be preferred due to the association between precision and expertise. Hence, 243 
participants in Experiment 4 rated the fluency of the predictions featuring a narrow and a 244 
wide interval, as well as the perceived expertise of the teams (see Supplementary materials for 245 
more details about the rating scales). 246 
For exploratory purposes, we included in Experiment 5 three measures of individual 247 
differences that might be related to the degree of perception of wide intervals as more 248 
uncertain and narrow intervals as more certain. Specifically, strong climate change beliefs 249 
could explain a preference for wide intervals as certain, since wide intervals can incorporate 250 
more extreme climate change values. In addition, people who are more numerate, and people 251 
who are able to understand the probability of occurrence of more than one event (i.e., people 252 
who correctly assess that the probability of one of two events is greater than the probability of 253 
occurrence of each of those events), might be better able to appraise that a wider interval 254 
means a greater likelihood to be correct. Hence, we included a climate change belief scale 255 
(Heath and Gifford 2006), a numeracy scale (Lipkus et al. 2001), and a disjunction task 256 
(adapted from Costello 2009). 257 
c. Results 258 
1) EFFECTS OF QUESTION FOCUS 259 
Participants in Experiments 1-5 received wide and narrow interval forecasts of sea 260 
level rise and temperature rise from two different (fictional) teams of climate scientists, and 261 
indicated which interval conveyed more (un)certainty (question focused on informativeness) 262 
or was more likely [(un)certain] to be correct (question focused on accuracy). 263 
 264 
<Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here> 265 
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 266 
Question focus strongly influenced certainty judgments (Figures 1 and 2). Participants 267 
largely chose the wide interval as the one that conveyed more uncertainty, and indicated that 268 
the narrow interval conveyed more certainty. Responses to questions about which interval 269 
was more likely or more certain to be correct were mixed: some experiments showed a small 270 
preference for the wide interval, while narrow and wide intervals were seen as equally certain 271 
in other experiments. 272 
Figure 3 summarizes the overall results (for all experiments with three response 273 
options, i.e., all experiments except Experiment 4), with responses coded according to 274 
whether wide intervals are seen as more certain (consistent with the accuracy mindset), 275 
narrow intervals are seen as more certain (consistent with the informativeness mindset), or 276 
both intervals are seen as equally likely. Analysis of Experiments 2, 3 and 5, where question 277 
focus was varied between-subjects and three response alternatives (wide more certain, narrow 278 
more certain, equal/”medium” interval more certain) were provided, showed a clear effect of 279 
question focus, χ2 (2, N=1080) = 213.373, p < .001. While wide intervals were clearly 280 
associated with uncertainty after informativeness-focused questions, more participants 281 
associated wide intervals with certainty after accuracy-focused questions. However, even for 282 
questions about correctness, where wide intervals should logically be chosen as more certain, 283 
only about 40% of the participants did so. 284 
2) RESULTS FOR SECONDARY HYPOTHESES 285 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated whether giving people an explanation for 286 
variability, for instance by telling them that the forecasts concerned sea level rise “in different 287 
parts of the world”, would facilitate the accuracy mindset (i.e., would make more people 288 
associate wide intervals with certainty). However, this hint about variability did not affect 289 
participants’ interval choice in either Experiment 1 (p = .150) or Experiment 2 (p = .303). 290 
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We further examined whether the accuracy and informativeness mindsets led to 291 
different inferences about the forecaster. Participants in Experiment 3 rated whether they 292 
found teams giving wide or narrow interval forecasts to have more expertise, on scales from 1 293 
(definitely the team with the wide interval) to 5 (definitely the team with the narrow interval). 294 
The average of the ratings of the experts across scenarios (i.e., an average of the four 295 
questions per scenario) were slightly higher in the “conveys more”-conditions (M = 3.50, SD 296 
= .73) than in the “to be correct”-conditions (M = 3.29, SD = .87), and this difference was 297 
significant, F(1,234) = 3.991, p = .047, η2p = .017. In other words, the team with narrow 298 
intervals was rated more positively after informativeness-focused questions, indicating that 299 
making one or the other mindset salient can influence how well both the prediction and the 300 
communicator is received. 301 
Experiment 4 investigated whether people find narrow intervals easier to process (i.e., 302 
more fluent) and more related to expertise than wide intervals. As predicted, participants 303 
judged the narrow interval as being easier to process and as reflecting more expertise than the 304 
wide interval (see Supplementary materials for more details about these findings). 305 
Finally, in Experiment 5 we set out to investigate individual differences that might be 306 
related to the preference for informativeness vs. accuracy. Specifically, we asked participants 307 
about their climate change beliefs, and gave them a test measuring numeracy, and a test 308 
measuring their understanding of disjunctive probabilities. However, there were no clear 309 
correlation patterns between interval choice and any of these three measures across groups, 310 
and the experiment did not have enough power to detect differences within each condition. 311 
 312 
3. Experiment 6: Is it more intuitive to associate wide intervals with uncertainty 313 
than with certainty? 314 
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Experiments 1-5 demonstrated that different question focus promotes different views 315 
about the relationship between certainty and interval width. However, the fact that only about 316 
40% endorsed wide intervals as “more certain to be correct”, indicates that it is more common 317 
to associate wide intervals with (subjective) uncertainty than with (objective) certainty. This 318 
raises the possibility that the lay view about the relationship between interval width and 319 
certainty is more in line with the informativeness mindset than with the accuracy mindset. 320 
In support of this idea, research on confidence intervals has repeatedly shown that 321 
people produce intervals that are too narrow for the assigned degree of certainty (Moore et al. 322 
2016). This consistent overprecision (Moore and Healy 2008) is very hard to eliminate and 323 
suggests that the preference for informativeness may be a dominant intuitive response. 324 
Studies showing that recipients of information in general prefer narrow intervals illustrate a 325 
similar point (Du et al. 2011; Jørgensen 2016; McKenzie and Amin 2002; Yaniv and Foster 326 
1995), as does the preliminary finding that people with higher numeracy can (sometimes) 327 
better appreciate the trade-off between precision and certainty than those with lower 328 
numeracy (Løhre and Teigen 2017). Hence, we ran Experiment 6 to test the hypothesis of an 329 
intuitive preference for informativeness among lay people. 330 
a. Materials and procedure 331 
The opening paragraph of the survey in Experiment 6 explained that climate scientists 332 
sometimes use intervals when giving their predictions of future outcomes, and presented two 333 
predictions concerning the expected sea level rise in the Oslo fjord. One of the predictions 334 
contained a wide interval (minimum 20 and maximum 60 cm sea level rise) and the other 335 
prediction contained a narrow interval (minimum 30 and maximum 50 cm sea level rise). 336 
Participants (students at the University of Oslo, N = 105, see Table 1) were randomly 337 
assigned to either the wide condition, where it was pointed out that one prediction is wider 338 
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than the other, or to the narrow condition, where it was pointed out that one prediction is 339 
narrower than the other. 340 
The text then explained that there are two different ways that one can think about the 341 
relationship between interval width and uncertainty, using the following formulation in the 342 
wide condition: 343 
“ – On the one hand, WIDE intervals indicate that it is MORE UNCERTAIN what the 344 
outcome will be (the sea level could rise by anything from 20 to 60 cm, compared to 30 to 345 
50 cm for the narrow interval) 346 
- On the other hand, it is MORE CERTAIN that projections using WIDE intervals will be 347 
correct (the forecast is correct if the sea level rises by anything from 20 to 60 cm, 348 
compared to 30 to 50 cm for the narrow interval)” 349 
In other words, the accuracy mindset (seeing the wide interval as more certain to be 350 
correct) and the informativeness mindset (seeing the wide interval as indicating that it is more 351 
uncertain what the outcome will be) were explained to the participants. In the narrow 352 
condition, the text explained that narrow intervals could be seen as indicating that it is more 353 
certain what the outcome will be, or that it is more uncertain that predictions using narrow 354 
intervals will be correct. The order of the statements was counterbalanced in both conditions. 355 
After reading the description of the different ways of thinking about intervals and 356 
uncertainty, participants were asked to rate how intuitive, natural, appealing, logical, and 357 
complicated they found the two ways of thinking, on scales from 1 (not intuitive/natural etc. 358 
at all) to 7 (very intuitive/natural etc.). Next, the participants were given tests of numeracy 359 
(Cokely et al. 2012; Schwartz et al. 1997) and cognitive reflection (Frederick 2005) to see 360 
whether individual differences in these abilities were related to a preference for 361 
informativeness or accuracy. Finally, participants were asked if they had already seen or 362 
responded to the cognitive reflection test online or in other experiments. 363 
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 364 
<Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here> 365 
 366 
b. Results 367 
Figures 4 and 5 display the ratings of the different mindsets for both wide and narrow 368 
intervals, and show that the view that wide intervals convey uncertainty was judged as more 369 
intuitive, natural, appealing, logical, and less complicated than the view that wide intervals 370 
are more certain to be correct. For simplicity we refer to this combination of attributes as 371 
more “intuitively appealing”. We also computed an average difference score to measure the 372 
degree to which one “mindset” was judged as more intuitively appealing than the other, by 373 
taking the “wide = uncertain” and “narrow = certain” ratings, which are in line with the 374 
informativeness mindset, and subtracting the corresponding “wide = certain” and “narrow = 375 
uncertain” ratings, which are in line with the accuracy mindset.2 Thus, positive difference 376 
scores indicate that the informativeness mindset is seen as more intuitively appealing than the 377 
accuracy mindset. The average difference score for the five items (Cronbach’s α = .74) did 378 
not differ between conditions, F(1,103) = .144, p = .706, η2p = .001. More interestingly, the 379 
average difference score across conditions was positive, M = .42, SD = 1.32, and differed 380 
significantly from 0, t(104) = 3.290, p = .001, 95% CI [.17, .68]. Hence, participants overall 381 
judged the informativeness mindset as more intuitively appealing than the accuracy mindset. 382 
There was no significant correlation with the average difference score for either the 383 
cognitive reflection test (r = .01, p = .958) or numeracy (r = .09, p = .355). However, people 384 
with higher cognitive reflection and numeracy perceived both mindsets as more intuitive, as 385 
shown by positive correlations between CRT and the informativeness (r = .20, p = .040) and 386 
accuracy mindsets (r = .21, p = .037), and between numeracy and the informativeness (r = 387 
                                                
2 The only exception was for the ratings of how complicated the participants found the two ways of thinking. 
Here the “wide = uncertain” ratings were subtracted from the “wide = certain” ratings, and the “narrow = 
certain” ratings were subtracted from the “narrow = uncertain” ratings. 
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.24, p = .014) and accuracy mindsets (r = .14, p = .161). Hence, higher scores on these 388 
measures indicate a tendency to find it intuitive to use intervals to express both certainty and 389 
uncertainty. 390 
 391 
4. General Discussion 392 
The experiments reported in this paper fill a gap in the literature about climate change 393 
communication (Moser 2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011) by investigating lay perceptions 394 
of the relationship between interval width (forecast precision) and certainty. We found 395 
evidence of two alternative ways of thinking. Overall, independent of question focus, 45% of 396 
our participants3 perceived narrow intervals as giving more certain knowledge about what the 397 
outcome will be, in line with what we have called a preference for informativeness; while 398 
26% of the participants perceived that wide intervals have a higher certainty of capturing the 399 
true value, displaying a preference for accuracy. These two opposite “mindsets” can be made 400 
more or less salient by drawing attention to different types of uncertainty. Questions about 401 
which interval conveys more (un)certainty (i.e., focusing more on subjective uncertainty) led 402 
to a consistent preference for informativeness, while questions about which interval is more 403 
certain/likely to be correct (i.e., focusing more on objective certainty) led to a response 404 
pattern more in line with the accuracy mindset. 405 
Questions focused on informativeness led to a clearer response pattern (wide intervals 406 
seen as uncertain and narrow ones as certain) than did questions focused on accuracy. It is 407 
somewhat puzzling that people were so divided in their answers to the question about which 408 
interval is more likely/certain to be correct. Logically, wider intervals are objectively more 409 
likely to capture the outcome value that will occur, as they cover both central (likely) and 410 
more peripheral (unlikely) values. Our results indicate that (perhaps for good reasons) people 411 
                                                
3 These percentages are based on all experiments with three response alternatives (wide more certain, narrow 
more certain, equal), i.e., Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5. 
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would like to know more precisely what the expected values are, and hence find it more 412 
intuitive to adopt the informativeness than the accuracy mindset, as shown in Experiment 6. 413 
Although the generalizability of the results should be investigated in non-western samples, we 414 
find it noteworthy that they are replicated in two different languages (Norwegian vs. English), 415 
in three different countries (Norway, UK, USA), and with both student and MTurk samples. 416 
Note also that our participants should be more educated and arguably more knowledgeable 417 
about these topics than more representative samples. Hence, one might expect an even 418 
stronger preference for informativeness in a more representative sample. 419 
These results have important theoretical implications, particularly for the literature on 420 
overprecision (Moore et al. 2016). The intuitive preference for informativeness means that 421 
wide intervals are usually associated with uncertainty, and as a result, people may not 422 
understand or agree that they should widen their intervals to increase their certainty. This can 423 
be said to strengthen the conversational norms/informativeness account of overprecision 424 
(Kaesler et al. 2016; Yaniv and Foster 1995, 1997). 425 
Climate scientists may choose to give wide intervals in order to present predictions 426 
with high certainty. Yet, our results show that wide intervals are a stronger signal of 427 
(subjective) uncertainty than of (objective) certainty, and the use of wide intervals may 428 
therefore undermine trust in climate scientists and their predictions. Although language that 429 
accentuates the accuracy mindset may make wide intervals more acceptable to the public (see 430 
Experiment 3), our results suggest that many recipients will still prefer narrow intervals, as 431 
suggested by 25% of the participants given accuracy-focused questions in our experiments 432 
(see Figure 3). Note, however, that in the current experiments, the participants only received 433 
intervals, and were asked about their perceptions of (un)certainty. In statements from the 434 
IPCC, intervals are often accompanied by verbal or numerical probability statements (e.g., 435 
“During the last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet very likely contributed between 436 
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1.4 and 4.3 m to higher global mean sea level”) (IPCC 2013). A recent study showed that 437 
explicitly mentioning the high certainty of wide intervals can counteract the tendency of lay 438 
people to see such intervals as uncertain, with most people stating that a wide interval with 439 
90% probability was more certain than a narrow interval with 50% probability (Teigen et al. 440 
2018).  441 
Nevertheless, the current evidence gives reason to be skeptical about the use of wide 442 
intervals to achieve high certainty in statements about climate change. However, presenting a 443 
precise interval along with a statement about the low certainty of such an interval is arguably 444 
not a much better option. One compromise solution would be to provide two intervals rather 445 
than one: a narrow (informative) interval paired with a wide (confident) interval, to satisfy 446 
both camps of readers. The drawback is that presenting two intervals simultaneously adds 447 
complexity to the communication of an already complex topic. Using graphical 448 
representations could be useful to simultaneously communicate informativeness and accuracy 449 
in a relatively simple way (Spiegelhalter et al. 2011). In any case, communicators should be 450 
aware that the current practice of claiming to be very certain about a very wide interval will to 451 
many readers sound like a contradiction in terms, which might damage rather than strengthen 452 
the public’s belief in climate science. 453 
  454 
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Tables 579 
 580 
Table 1. Demographics for the samples used in the different experiments. 581 
 582 
Experiment no. n Sample Mean age (SD) Female Male 
1 81 University of Essex students 24.0 (6.5) 80.2% 19.8% 
2 201 Amazon Mechanical Turk 37.9 (12.0) 51.7% 48.3% 
3 238 Amazon Mechanical Turk 37.7 (11.2) 47.9% 52.1% 
4 302 Amazon Mechanical Turk 34.6 (10.4) 44.4% 55.6% 
5 101 University of Essex, 
snowball sampling 
28.0 (13.1) 36.6% 62.4% 
6 105 University of Oslo students 23.1 (4.9) 76.2% 23.8% 
 583 
584 
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Table 2. Overview of questions, response options and design used in the different experiments 585 
regarding interval predictions of climate change outcomes. 586 
 587 
Experiment 
no. 
Question(s)/ statements 
focused on informativeness: 
“Which interval conveys…” 
Question(s)/statements 
focused on accuracy: “Which 
interval is…” 
Response options Design 
1 “…most uncertainty” “… most likely to be correct” Wide, narrow, equal Within-subjects 
2 “… most uncertainty” “… most likely to be correct” Wide, narrow, equal Between-subjects 
3 “… more uncertainty” 
“… more certainty” 
“… more certain to be 
correct” 
“… more uncertain to be 
correct” 
Wide, narrow, equal Between-subjects 
4 “… more uncertainty” 
“… more certainty” 
“… more certain to be 
correct” 
 
Wide, narrow Between-subjects 
5 “… more uncertainty” 
“… more certainty” 
“… more certain to be 
correct” 
 
Wide, “medium”, 
narrow 
Between-subjects 
6 “Wide intervals indicate that it 
is more uncertain what the 
outcome will be” 
“Narrow intervals indicate that 
it is more certain what the 
outcome will be” 
“It is more certain that 
projections using wide 
intervals will be correct” 
“It is more uncertain that 
projections using narrow 
intervals will be correct” 
Ratings of the 
intuitive appeal of 
both statements 
Within-subjects 
  588 
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Figures 589 
 590 
 591 
 592 
Figure 1. Choices of which interval conveys more certainty and uncertainty. 593 
 594 
 595 
 596 
 597 
Figure 2. Choices of which interval is more certain/likely and more uncertain to be correct. 598 
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 602 
 603 
Figure 3. Overall preference for wide vs. narrow intervals as “more certain” for all 604 
experiments with three response options (Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5). 605 
 606 
 607 
 608 
 609 
 610 
Figure 4. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about wide intervals (wide is certain vs. 611 
wide is uncertain) in Experiment 6, error bars +/- 1 SEM. 612 
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 617 
Figure 5. Mean perceptions of two ways of thinking about narrow intervals (narrow is 618 
uncertain vs. narrow is certain) in Experiment 6, error bars +/- 1 SEM. 619 
 620 
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